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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Daisha Maloney appeals, contending the district court erred when it denied her motion to
suppress the evidence found in her purse. Since Ms. Maloney' s purse was not in the car when
the officer developed probable cause to search it, the district court erred in allowing the search of
her purse under the automobile exception. 1 This is an issue which has not yet been addressed in
a published decision in Idaho, but an unpublished decision from the Court of Appeals has
acknowledged his principle. As such, this Court should vacate Ms. Maloney's conviction and
reverse the order denying the motion to suppress the evidence in this case.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Officers stopped the car Ms. Maloney was driving because its registration was expired.
(Tr., p.9, Ls.7-10.)2 One officer proceeded to check the identifications provided by Ms. Maloney
and her passenger and to write a citation. 3 (Tr., p.10, L.8-12.) Meanwhile, the other officer
informed Ms. Maloney that her car had been previously reported for potential drug activity.
(Tr., p.10, Ls.13-15.) Ms. Maloney explained that was not surprising, as her husband, Steven
Willis,4 had recently been arrested for drug possession out of the same car. (Tr., p.10, Ls.17-18,
p.14, L.20 - p.15, L.3.)

1

The State did not argue that any other exception to the warrant requirement applied in this case.
All citations to "Tr." refer to the transcript of the motion to suppress hearing contained in the
electronic file "20190211 13806 FD."
3
The parties apparently agreed there was no issue with respect to the length of the detention.
(See Tr., p.8, Ls.6-11.)
4
The record is not entirely clear whether Mr. Willis was Ms. Maloney's husband, ex-husband, or
boyfriend, as it refers to him in all three ways. (See Tr., p.10, L.16; Tr., p.7, L.4; R., p.79.)
However, their precise relationship is irrelevant to the issue on appeal in this case.
2

1

The officer asked if Ms. Maloney would consent to a search of the car, and she agreed.
(Tr., p.10, Ls.19-20.) However, as she got out of the car, she took her purse with her. (Tr., p.7,
Ls.6-8, p.11, Ls.6-7.) At no point during the encounter did she consent to a search of her purse.
(Tr., p.6, Ls.3-5, p.16, Ls.17-19) The officer told Ms. Maloney she and the passenger could go
stand in the shade while he conducted the search, as it was a hot afternoon. (Tr., p.10, Ls.20-21,
p.11, Ls.15-18.)
During the consensual search, the officer found a marijuana pipe in a basket or bag in the
back seat on the passenger side of the vehicle. (Tr., p.11, Ls.21-25; compare Tr., p.13, Ls.21-23
(the officer describing the container as a laundry basket), with Tr., p.24, Ls.19-20 (the officer
admitting his probable cause affidavit described the container as a bag). The officer also found
Mr. Willis' wallet and identification, as well as various items that could have belonged to either a
man or a woman, in that container. (Tr., p.15, Ls.1-17, p.20, L.22 - p.21, L.25.) The officer
recalled being informed that Ms. Maloney was in the process of moving. (Tr., p.21, Ls.3-4.)
Ms. Maloney stated the container did belong her, but that it contained a lot of Mr. Willis'
belongings.

(Tr., p.22, Ls.1-6.)

The officer decided not to charge Ms. Maloney with the

marijuana pipe because he felt it was more likely that it belonged to her husband. (Tr., p.15,
L.18 - p.16, L.9.)
While the officer was conducting the consensual search, the other officer informed him
over the radio that the passenger had an active warrant for her arrest. (Tr., p.11, Ls.15-16;
but see Tr., p.7, Ls.2-5 (Ms. Maloney recalling that the officer told her about the passenger's

warrant when he asked Ms. Maloney to get out of the car).) As such, when the officer completed
the search, he arrested the passenger. (Tr., p.12, Ls.11-15.) At that point, he went back to
Ms. Maloney and informed her that, based on finding the pipe in the car, he needed to search her

2

purse. (Tr., p.12, Ls.15-17; see Tr., p.6, Ls.6-9 (Ms. Maloney explaining her purse was on the
sidewalk next to her when the officer asked to search it).) Inside her purse, the officer found a
baggie containing a pipe with white crystal residue. (Tr., p.12, L.24 - p.13, L.4.) Based on that,
the State charged Ms. Maloney with possession of methamphetamine.

(Tr., p.5, Ls.5-6;

R., pp.47-48.)
Ms. Maloney filed a motion to suppress the evidence found in her purse. (R., pp.72,
78-80.)

The State responded by arguing that the officer could search her purse under the

automobile exception to the warrant requirement. 5 (E.g., Tr., p.29, Ls.15-23.) Defense counsel
replied that the automobile exception only extended to containers that were in the car at the time
probable cause developed, and so, did not apply to Ms. Maloney's purse, which was outside of
the car when probable cause developed. 6 (Tr., p.31, L.21 - p.34, L.8.) The district court agreed
with the State and denied Ms. Maloney's motion. (Tr., p.35, L.21 - p.40, L.8.)
Subsequently, Ms. Maloney entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving her right to
appeal that order. (See R., pp.117-18.) Thereafter, the district court imposed a unified sentence
of four years, with two years fixed, and retained jurisdiction. 7 (R., p.162.) She filed a notice of
appeal timely from that judgment of conviction. (R., pp.176-79.)

5

The State did not file a written objection or brief (See generally R.) Rather, the prosecutor
simply made arguments at the hearing on the motion to suppress. (See generally Tr., p.29,
L.7 - p.35, L. 11.)
6
Counsel's assertion was that probable cause only developed once the marijuana pipe was
found. (See generally Tr., p.31, L.21 - p.34, L.8.)
7
Ms. Maloney has since been placed on probation. (Aug. p.1.) A motion to augment the record
with that order has been filed contemporaneously with this brief
3

ISSUE
Whether the search of Ms. Maloney's purse was not lawful under the automobile exception
because her purse was not in the car when the officer developed probable cause to search the car.

4

ARGUMENT
The Search Of Ms. Maloney's Purse Was Not Lawful Under The Automobile Exception Because
Her Purse Was Not In The Car When The Officer Developed Probable Cause To Search The Car

A.

Standard Of Review
The appellate courts apply a bifurcated standard when reviewing the denial of a motion to

suppress evidence. State v. Easterday, 159 Idaho 173, 175 (Ct. App. 2015). They will accept the
trial court's findings of fact if they are supported by substantial evidence, but they will freely
review the application of the constitutional principles to those facts. Id.

B.

The Container Must Be In The Car When Probable Cause To Search Car Develops In
Order For That Probable Cause To Extend To That Container, And Thereby Justify The
Search Of That Container Under The Automobile Exception
A unanimous United States Supreme Court has held that warrantless searches are per se

unreasonable. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978). Therefore, a warrantless search is
presumed to violate the Fourth Amendment, unless the State demonstrates that one of the
exceptional, well-established, and well-delineated exceptions to this requirement is applicable to
the facts. Id. at 390-91. The only exception to the warrant requirement which the State invoked
in this case was the automobile exception. (See Tr., p.29, L.7 - p.31, L.18.) As with all Fourth
Amendment analyses, the existence of that exception, and the extent to which it allows the
officer to search, is based on the facts known to the officer at the moment of the search. State v.

Johnson, 152 Idaho 56, 61 (Ct. App. 2011).
The automobile exception only applies when the officers have probable cause to believe
the car contains contraband. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 824 (1982); Carroll v. United

States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). The probable cause to search the car encompasses all containers

5

that are in the car. California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 580 (1991). As such, it authorizes a
search of both the car and the containers therein. Id.
However, there are limitations on the scope of the automobile exception. For example,
the it does not authorize the officers to search the occupants of the car themselves or the
containers they have on their persons. Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 303 (1999); State v.
Gibson, 141 Idaho 277, 283 (Ct. App. 2005). That is because a person's mere proximity to a

location where a search is authorized does not give the officers probable cause to search that
person. Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91 (1979); Gibson, 141 Idaho at 283.
Furthermore, if the officer only has information that indicates contraband is in a container
in the trunk of a car, he is constitutionally-prohibited from searching the passenger compartment
or any containers in the passenger compartment.

Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 580 (expressly

"reaffirm[ing] that principle"). Likewise, finding evidence in the passenger compartment of a
car will not automatically give the officer the ability to search the trunk. State v. Schmadeka,
136 Idaho 595, 600 (Ct. App. 2001) (holding that the odor of burnt marijuana and a single
firecracker (which may not have actually been illegal to possess) in the passenger compartment
did not give probable cause to search the trunk under the automobile exception).

That is

important because, if probable cause does not justify a search of a particular part of the car, then
officers cannot search any containers in that part of the car either under the automobile
exception. State v. Lovely, 159 Idaho 675, 678 (Ct. App. 2016) (explaining that the diminished
expectation of privacy that a person has in an automobile "does not mean that an officer can
search a bag without probable cause"). As such, the limitations on the automobile exception all
turn on the extent to which the probable cause reaches.

6

Consistent with those principles, the Idaho Court of Appeals has acknowledged another
limitation on the scope of the automobile exception - the container in question has to actually be
inside the car at the time probable cause develops in order for that probable cause to actually
extend to that container: "Under the automobile exception, any package capable of a crime or
related contraband that is located in the vehicle at the time probable cause develops may be
searched for evidence of that crime or related contraband." See State v. Holt, 2017 WL 3574623,
*4 (Ct. App. 2017) (citing State v. Smith, 152 Idaho 115, 120-21 (Ct. App. 2011)) (emphasis
added). 8 In Holt, Court of Appeals ultimately concluded officers could search the occupant's
purse "the officer had probable cause to search the vehicle pursuant to the automobile exception
before ordering anyone out of the vehicle" and the purse remained in the car throughout the
encounter. Id. at **4-5.
While Idaho has not formally recognized this principle in a published opinion, it is, as
discussed supra, consistent with the other recognized limitations on the automobile exception. It
is also reflected in Idaho's case law relating to other exceptions to the warrant requirement. For
example, the Court of Appeals has disallowed an inventory search of luggage which the officer
unlawfully refused to allow the occupants to remove the containers without probable cause. See

State v. Ross, 160 Idaho 757, 760 (Ct. App. 2016) (the State actually conceded that the officer's
demand was unlawful in that case).

8

Ms. Maloney recognizes that unpublished decisions do not constitute precedent, and she does
not cite Holt as authority requiring a particular decision in this case. Rather, she merely
references it as a historical example of how a learned court has analyzed the question at issue
here. Compare Staff of Idaho Real Estate Comm 'n v. Nordling, 135 Idaho 630, 634 (2001)
(quoting Bourgeois v. Murphy, 119 Idaho 611, 617 (1991)) ("When this Court had cause to
consider unpublished opinions from other jurisdictions because an appellant had discussed the
cases in his petition, we found the presentation of the unpublished opinions as 'quite
appropriat[e].' Likewise, we find the hearing officer's consideration of the unpublished opinion,
not as binding precedent but as an example, was appropriate.").
7

Likewise, the Idaho Supreme Court has disallowed searches of containers incident to the
arrest of an occupant when the officer unlawfully ordered the person to leave the container inside
a car without probable cause. See State v. Newsom, 132 Idaho 698, 700 (1998); compare State v.
Holland, 135 Idaho 159, 162-63 (2000) (holding a search of a purse incident to the driver's arrest

was permissible because the defendant had voluntarily left the purse in the car when she got out).
In that scenario, the Idaho Supreme Court has held, the purse was simply outside the scope of the
search authorized pursuant to an ensuing arrest. 9 State v. Wright, 134 Idaho 73, 78 (2000). Holt
simply recognized a similar principle exists with respect to the automobile exception.
Additionally, consistent with the principle recognized in Holt, Idaho's courts allow
searches of containers under the automobile exception when probable cause developed before the
container in question was removed from the car. For example, in Smith, the officer saw a
marijuana pipe in plain view on the passenger seat of the defendant's car. Smith, 152 Idaho at
117. Thereafter, the defendant got his backpack out of the car and kept it out of the car for the
remainder of the encounter. Id. The Court of Appeals held that, even though the search of the
backpack occurred outside the car, it was still appropriate under the automobile exception
because the officer had probable cause to search the car as a result of seeing the paraphernalia in
plain view. Id. at 121. That probable cause extended to all the containers in the car at the
moment the officer saw the paraphernalia, which included the backpack.
Similarly, in Easterday, a drug dog alerted on the car while the defendant and her purse
were still inside. Easterday, 159 Idaho at 174. As such, the officers could search her purse
pursuant to the automobile exception. Id. at 176-77. The probable cause created by the dog's
9

At the time Wright was decided, officers could still search the entire passenger compartment of
a car incident to an arrest. See Wright, 134 Idaho at 78 (citing New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454
(1981)). Belton, of course, has since been abrogated by Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 343
(2009), and the scope of searches of cars incident to the arrest of an occupant are more restricted.
8

alert extended to all the containers in the car at that moment, which included the purse. 10 Thus,
Idaho's case law reflects the principle recognized in Holt, and so, this Court should formally
adopt that principle.
That is also true because, while Idaho has not specifically addressed this principle in a
published opinion, several other states have done so. Most comparable to Ms. Maloney's case is
a recent case out of Arkansas. See Sossamon v. State, 576 S.W.3d 520 (Ark. Ct. App. 2019). In
that case, Ms. Sossamon was driving a car that was pulled over for speeding in the early morning
hours. Id. at 522. The car's owner - who was one of the passengers in the car and who, the
officer learned, had a history of drug convictions - subsequently consented to a search of the car.
Id. at 522-23. Ms. Sossamon declared that she did not want her bags searched as part of the

search of the car. Id. at 523. The officer, who admitted he did not have probable cause at that
point, allowed Ms. Sossamon to remove her bags from the car before he searched the car. Id.
During the consensual search, the officer found a pipe and methamphetamine in the car owner's
purse, which had been left on the back seat of the car. Id. Based on that, the officer proceeded
to search Ms. Sossamon's bags, where he found more drugs. Id.
The Arkansas Court of Appeals held the search of Ms. Sossamon' s purse was unlawful
because, as in Ms. Maloney's case, "by the time [the officer] discovered the drugs in [the car
owner's] purse, Sossamon's bags were no longer inside the vehicle." Id. at 528-29. That was an
important fact, the Court explained, because the United States Supreme Court's articulation of
10

Easterday acknowledged the decision in Gibson, 141 Idaho at 281-82, wherein the search of
the defendant's wallet was not authorized by the automobile exception even though it had been
in the car at the time the dog alerted on the car. See Easterday, 159 Idaho at 176-77. However,
as Easterday pointed out, the decision in Gibson was based on the limitation that the automobile
exception does not give probable cause to search the occupants themselves. Id. at 176-77 & n.3;
accord Houghton, 526 U.S. 303 n.1 (explaining there is a distinction under the automobile
exception between property contained in clothing worn by an occupant of the car and her
property in a container such as a briefcase or a purse).
9

the rule focuses on whether the containers are in the car: '"a passenger's personal belongings,
just like the driver's belongings or containers attached to the car like a glove compartment, are
'in' the car, and the officer has probable cause to search for contraband in the car."' Id. at
526-27 (quoting Houghton, 526 U.S. at 302) (emphasis from Houghton). Since Ms. Sossamon's
bags were not in the car during the time the officer had probable cause to search the car, they
could not be searched pursuant to the automobile exception. Id.
The Kansas Supreme Court reached the same conclusion. See State v. Boyd, 64 P.3d 419,
427 (Kan. 2003).

There, too, the officer was given consent to search the car. Id. at 421.

Ms. Boyd, a passenger in the car, refused to consent to a search of her purse as part of that search
and tried to take it with her as she got out of the car. Id. However, the officer told Ms. Boyd that
she had to leave her purse in the car. Id. The officer found drug paraphernalia in the center
console of the car, and thereafter, searched Ms. Boyd's purse. Id. at. Relying in part on the
Idaho Supreme Court's decision in Newsom, 132 Idaho 698, the Kansas Supreme Court held the
officer could not lawfully order Ms. Boyd to leave her purse in the car at that point because he
"had no probable cause to believe illegal drugs were in the car when Boyd was told by the officer
to get out of the car. Thus, at that point, the officer did not have probable cause to search Boyd
or her purse." Id. at 283. The State in that case conceded the remainder of the analysis - that, "if
Boyd would have been allowed to take her purse with her the officer could not have lawfully
searched her or her purse" under the automobile exception despite finding the paraphernalia in
the car. Id.
The Maryland Court of Appeals has offered additional insights about the nature and
extent of this issue and explaining where that principle is evident in the relevant United States

10

Supreme Court opinions. II State v. Funkhouser, 782 A.2d 387, 398 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2001).
(emphasizing the relevant language in quotes from Houghton, 526 U.S. at 297, 300-01, & 307,

Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 572, and United States v. Johns, 469 U.S. 478, 479-80 (1985)). As such, in
Funkhouser, the fanny pack in question was not subject to search under the automobile exception
because the defendant had taken it out of the car prior to the officers developing probable cause.

Funkhouser, 782 A.2d at 398-99. In those circumstances, the Maryland Court declared, "[u]nder
no stretch of the imagination could the warrantless seizure and subsequent search of the 'fanny
pack' be held to fall within the scope of a Carroll Doctrine search of the Jeep Wrangler."

Funkhouser, 782 A.2d at 399.
The Maryland Court also explained the flaw in the State's counterargument - such a rule
would not be evaluating the facts as they actually existed, but rather, would require the trial court
to evaluate the situation as if the defendant and her purse were constructively still in the car. Id.
at 396-97. Of course, the analysis under the Fourth Amendment looks at what the situation the
officers actually encountered, not what hypothetically could have been. See, e.g., Johnson, 152
Idaho at 61. The district court's analysis in Ms. Maloney's case contains that same flaw.
Finally, the Oregon Court of Appeals has used the same principle to uphold a search of a
container. See State v. Furillo, 362 P.3d 273, 277 n.6 (Or. Ct. App. 2015). In Furillio, both the
defendant and his backpack were in the car when the drug dog alerted on the car. Id. at 275. As
such, the Oregon Court distinguished Funkhouser and held the automobile exception justified the
search of the backpack even though the defendant took it with him when he got out of the car

11

Funkhouser's discussion of this principle is dicta, as the court's main holding in that case was
that the initial stop was not lawful. See Carter v. State, 182 A.3d 236, 246 n.8 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 2018). However, its analysis of this issue is thorough, well-reasoned, and consistent with
Idaho's case law in this area of the law as well as the Court of Appeals' analysis in Holt. As
such, this Court should still consider and join with Funkhouser's analysis of this issue.
11

because it had been in the car when probable cause arose. Id. at 276-77; compare, e.g., Smith,
152 Idaho at 121 (reaching the same conclusion). The Ohio Court of Appeals has also recently
upheld a search on that same rationale:

"While [the defendant's] purse was in the vehicle,

probable cause arose that allowed the officers to search the interior of the vehicle and containers
therein." State v. Raslovsky, 2020-Ohio-515, 2020 WL 748200, *5 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 14,
2020). The fact that probable cause can, and often does, arise before any occupants get out of
the car, and thus, authorizes searches of containers which are subsequently removed from the
car, 12 demonstrates that the district court's concern in this case - that the principle acknowledged
in Holt would lead to occupants of cars trying to thwart searches by taking as many containers as
possible out of the car before the search (Tr., p.37, L.20 - p.38, L.3) - is unfounded.
Applying the principle acknowledged in Holt to Ms. Maloney's case reveals that the
search of her purse was not justified under the automobile exception.

That is because she

Maloney got out of the car and took her purse with her prior to any probable cause developing.
In other words, when probable cause subsequently arose to search the car and its contents, the
purse was simply not a part of the car's contents, so the probable cause did not extend to the
purse. As such, the district court's order denying Ms. Maloney's motion to suppress on that
basis should be reversed.

12

See, e.g., Easterday, 159 Idaho at 174 (holding a search appropriate under the automobile
exception when probable cause arose before the occupants got out of the car); Smith, 152 Idaho
at 121 (same); Holt, 2017 WL 3574623 at *4 (same); Furillo, 362 P.3d at 277 n.6 (same);
Raslovsky, 2020 WL 748200 at *5 (same); see also Gibson, 141 Idaho 277 (where probable
cause arose before the occupants got out of the car, but the search was invalid under a different
limitation to the automobile exception); Schmadeka, 136 Idaho at 596 (same).

12

CONCLUSION
Ms. Maloney respectfully requests this Court vacate her conviction, reverse the order
denying her motion to suppress, and remand this case for whatever additional proceedings
might be needed.
DATED this 11 th day of March, 2020.

Isl Brian R. Dickson
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Deputy State Appellate Public Defender

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 11 th day of March, 2020, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing APPELLANT'S BRIEF, to be served as follows:
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov

Isl Evan A. Smith
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant

BRDleas

13

